Collective Action Frames and Policy Windows: The Case of the Project to Export Liquefied Natural Gas from Bolivia to California by J Carlos Dominguez (QEH)
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS127  Page 1 
 
Working Paper Number 127 
 
 
Collective Action Frames and Policy Windows: 
The Case of the Project to Export Liquefied Natural Gas from 






How and why can a political mobilisation prevent what appears to be an 
economically  rational  and  beneficial  government  investment?    The 
present  paper  explores  the  ways  in  which  both  public  policy  and 
contentious politics theories can be potentially bridged to answer this 
question.    It  suggests  ways  in  which  concepts  used  by  public  policy 
theorists  such  as  ‘policy  windows’  (Kingdon,  1984)  or  ‘advocacy 
coalitions’ (Sabatier, 1999) may be useful to understand the emergence 
of political opportunities or the construction of collective action frames. 
The  case study  to be  used  is  the  project  to  export liquefied  gas from 
Bolivia  to  California,  which  was  promoted  by  the  administration  of 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 2002 and was cancelled after civil society 
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How and why can a political mobilisation prevent what appears to be an economically 
rational  and  beneficial  government  investment?    This  work  aims  to  answer  this 
question by bridging social movement theories and public policy theories to give a 
more comprehensive account of the dynamic processes through which policy makers 
promote a project and social mobilisations emerge to resist it.  
The case study to be used is the project to export liquefied natural gas (LNGP) 
from Bolivia to California, which was promoted by the administration of Gonzalo 
Sanchez de Lozada in 2003 and was cancelled after civil society groups not only 
mobilised to resist it, but demanded the resignation of the president. 
  A  comprehensive  link  of  both  fields  –public  policy  and  social  movement 
theories- is beyond the scope of this work. Therefore, the core analysis centres on how 
a policy window (Kingdon, 1984) emerges; how a collective action frame (Snow and 
Benford,  1992;  Tarrow,  1992;  1998)  is  constructed;  and  how  both  concepts  are 
related.  
The  approach  is  theory  linking
2  and  therefore,  the  relevant  question  is 
decomposed in three sub-sets: a) for the policy process, why did the government of 
Sanchez de Lozada decide to promote the LNGP, even in the context of widespread 
political and social opposition? b) Regarding the social mobilisations, how did the 
opposing groups gain support and mobilise successfully against the LNGP; and what 
were the key conditions for its success? c) And to bridge both fields, in what ways can 





This  work  constitutes  a  first  attempt  to  articulate  the  case  study  and  it  has  two 
shortcomings. In the first place, the analysis is not based on field interviews but in 
secondary  sources  such  as  journalistic  articles  and  documents  published  on  the 
internet. In this respect, the analysis and conclusions have a hypothetical character 
and shall be verified or falsified with extensive fieldwork and a more comprehensive 
documentation.  
In the second place, the proposed theoretical framework has been used before 
to analyse other case studies and it is ‘transposed’ here to make sense of the Bolivian 
experience.
3 For this reason, some theoretical concepts might have ‘taken over’ to 
replace reality. If this is the case, a more refined and accurate analysis shall also arise 
from the analysis of more empirical information. 
 
                                                 
2 The use of different theories from different fields to make sense of a case study and/or 
answer a research question motivated by an empirical problem. 




II. MULTIPLE STREAMS AND ADVOCACY COALITIONS 
 
Why  did  the  government  of  Sanchez  de  Lozada  decide  to  promote  the  project  to 
export  liquefied  natural  gas  even  when  there  was  widespread  social  and  political 
opposition? What failures, if any, were committed during its implementation? 
  In contrast with a rational approach to public policy, the Multiple Streams 
Framework (MSF) structures a system of interactions on the basis of four streams: 
actors, problems, policies, and politics. The main premise of the MSF is that an issue 
reaches the policy agenda when a problem, a policy solution, and someone willing to 
advance  it  –the  policy  entrepreneur-  coincide  in  time  and  open  a  policy  window 
(Kingdon, 1984). 
  The main objective of this section is to show that the promotion and official 
announcement  of  the  liquefied  natural  gas  project  can  be  explained  by  the  MSF. 
Section  2.1  characterises  the  actors  participating  in  the  policy  process  and 
complements  the  ideas  of  Kingdon  (1984)  with  the  notion  of  advocacy  coalitions 
(Sabatier, 1988). Section 2.2 describes the appearance of a policy window in 2003 and 
the  alternatives  faced  by  the  government  of  Sanchez  de  Lozada.  An  exhaustive 
analysis of these elements is beyond the scope of this work and therefore, the core 
analysis is centred on the appearance of a policy window and its relations to the rest 
of the theory.  
 
 
2.1 Actors and Advocacy Coalitions 
 
According to the MSF actors influencing the policy process can be divided in two 
clusters. A visible cluster is composed for example, by the president, his cabinet, the 
media,  state  governors,  and  high  level  appointees.  Then,  a  hidden  cluster 
compromises  actors  such  as  civil  servants  of  lower  hierarchy,  consultants,  and 
academics. The first cluster is involved in the agenda setting, while the second is 
usually the one who generates the agenda.
4  
  This characterisation is not free of criticisms (Zahariadis, 1999:81-85). Most 
importantly, it portrays monolithic actors using categories such as ‘pressure groups’, 
‘the  media’,  or  ‘the  administration’.  In  this  sense,  although  Kingdon  (1984) 
recognises different levels of cohesion, it seems that he assumes each of these actors 
usually moves in the same direction. As the case study shows, this is not always the 
case.  
  For  example,  the  loose  governmental  coalition  that  was  shaped  to  win  the 
elections  in  2002  might  have  contributed  to  divisions  regarding  the  LNGP.
5  The 
leaders of the traditional political parties constituting such coalition agreed on the 
                                                 
4 The concept of ‘agenda’ refers to ‘…the list of subjects or problems to which governmental 
officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying 
some serious attention at any given time…’(Kingdon, 1984:3). Then, ‘generating the agenda’ 
refers to the accumulation of knowledge and the formulation of policy solutions on the basis of 
this  knowledge;  while  ‘setting  the  agenda’  refers  to  ‘…the  transfer  of  items  from  a  non-
governmental agenda… to a governmental, “formal” agenda…’ (ibid:16) 
5 As explained in Section 3.2 the governmental coalition was constituted in 2002 by three 
dominant parties with dissimilar political platforms to block the victory of the MAS (Movimiento 
al Socialismo) in a second voting round.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS127  Page 4 
 
 
project or refrained from disqualifying it, but all of them had different ideas about the 
main goals and the ways it should be done.
6  
An additional category that emerges in the case study and that did not behave 
homogenously is that of ‘international actors’, most importantly the governments of 
Chile and Peru. Both of them lobbied heavily in favour of their respective ports to 
export  the  natural  gas  and  became  clear  rivals.  The  government  of  Chile  even 
considered setting an economic zone so that new industries to be located near the port 
of Patillos would be ruled by Bolivian laws.  By contrast, the government of Peru 
offered to compensate for additional costs of building a pipeline that was necessarily 
longer.  
In the category of ‘public interest groups’ (Kingdon, 1984:48), most unions 
joined the mobilisations against the LNGP. However, some of the unions from the 
province of Tarija rejected the social movement and preferred to organise a forum to 
discuss the costs and benefits of different alternatives to exploit the natural gas (La 
Prensa, 19-09-03).  
  A  complementary  way  to  characterise  participants  in  the  policy  process  is 
according to advocacy  coalitions (Sabatier, 1988, 1991; and Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1993). This concept takes into account a dimension that Kingdon does not 
incorporate in his analysis: the divisions and confrontations of participants are based 
on knowledge and beliefs about a problem and its possible solutions.  
  The  factors  that  determine  the  cohesion  of  an  advocacy  coalition  are  a 
significant degree of coordinated activity through time and the sharing of normative 
and causal beliefs.  In this sense, the concept cannot be fully applied to the case study 
because the LNGP was only designed between 2001 and 2002. Therefore, the first 
requirement –coordinated activity through time- was not met. However, even when 
there  were  no  consolidated  advocacy  coalitions  it  is  still  possible  to  talk  about 
emerging advocacy coalitions (EACs) based on the second requirement –normative 
and causal beliefs. 
  A  first  advocacy  coalition  was  constituted  by  the  government  of  Gonzales 
Sanchez de Lozada –including the three traditional political parties-, foreign firms 
behind Pacific LNG, the entrepreneurial sector from Tarija, and other civil society 
groups  from  this  region  such  as  the  regional  worker’s  union.  Its  cohesion  was  a 
function  of  three  policy  core  beliefs:
7  a)  the  natural  gas  should  be  exploited  and 
monetised in export markets; b) economically and technically, the best alternative was 
to export via the port of Patillos in Chile; c) in order to undertake such an ambitious 
project, the participation of foreign capital was crucial. 
  A second advocacy coalition was formed by non-traditional political parties 
such as the MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo), the Movimiento Indígena Pachakutik, 
and the Communist Party of Bolivia; the unions’ movement and other civil society 
groups  such  as  professional  associations  and  Aymara  intellectuals.  The  main  core 
beliefs were: a) the law of hydrocarbons should be changed to limit the participation 
of foreign capital and increase the royalties perceived by the Bolivian state; and b) the 
natural gas should and could preferably be industrialised before exporting it.  
   
                                                 
6 This conclusion is based on the comparison between declarations of Bertero (2003), Reyes 
(2003) and Zamora (2003) with other stances by the Bolivian government. 
7 This concept refers to beliefs about solutions to a specific problem that result from long 




2.2 Problems, Policies, and Politics: The Opening of a Policy Window 
 
The  generation of policy  alternatives is usually incremental, because ideas do not 
come  from  nowhere  (Richardson  and  Jordan,  1979).  On  the  contrary,  proposals 
evolve historically and adapt to broader circumstances and specific interests of actors 
participating in the policy game (Kingdon, 1984:79; based on Lindblom). However, 
the main thesis of the MSF is that this continuity is sometimes interrupted when a 
certain issue ‘hits the policy agenda’ (idem).  
  The  historical  changes  in  the  natural  gas  policy  can  be  explained  by  an 
incremental approach to public policy; but the sudden decision to turn the LNGP into 
the  centrepiece  of  this  policy  is  better  explained  by  the  MSF.  According  to  this 
approach a sudden policy change is explained by three independent streams that when 
coinciding, open a policy window (Kingdon, 1984:87-88). The first stream explains 
how problems ‘catch’ the attention of decision makers, which can happen in at least 
four ways: a) available indicators show that a problem exists; b) specific studies are 
conducted; c) feedback on existing programs show a failure; or d) a contingency -such 
as a crisis or a disaster- draws attention to a particular problem (Kingdon, 1984:90-
102). 
  In the case study, the main indicator was the amount of probed and likely 
reserves of natural gas.
8 In the mid-1990s, the official data showed the existence of 
around 5.7 Tcf
9 (YPFB, cited in La Prensa, 09-09-03). However, in 1996 a new law of 
hydrocarbons was approved to allow the participation of private and foreign capital in 
the  hydrocarbons  sector.  Thereafter,  a  number  of  foreign  firms  invested  in  the 
exploitation of natural gas and undertook new studies to find new reserves. In just five 
years, probed and likely reserves increased from 5.7 to 54.9 Tcf (idem). The problem 
was  how  to  exploit  and  monetise  these  resources  to  increase  the  income  of  the 
Bolivian state and balance the public finances (Zavaleta, 27-01-05) 
But the existence of a problem or a condition is not enough to explain the 
decision of announcing the LNGP in 2003. After all, the discovery of new reserves 
was  not  a  guarantee  that  it  was  feasible  to  exploit  and  monetise  these  resources. 
Following from this, the second stream shows how proposals to solve a given problem 
emerge through time. The actors in this stream are specialists in a given sector and 
usually  belong  to  the  hidden  cluster.  They  are  members  of  policy  communities  –
researchers, consultants, and analysts of interest groups- that are engaged with the 
accumulation of knowledge about certain policy issues (Kingdon, 1984:117) 
  The presence of policy entrepreneurs is a crucial driver in the policy stream. 
These actors are usually the ones willing to advocate a policy alternative and ‘sell it’ 
in expectation of future returns. In the case study the main policy entrepreneurs were 
the oil companies that created the Pacific LNG Consortium
10 in 2001. They designed 
the LNGP and their lobbying activities were crucial to push the project into the policy 
agenda.   
                                                 
8  The  probed  reserves  are  those  that  have  been  discovered  and  developed,  but  not 
exhausted; and the likely reserves are those that have been discovered but which volumes –
except for the total ones- are not known with certainty. 
9 Tcf stands for ‘trillions of cubic feet’.  
10 Pacific LNG is a consortium constituted by three oil companies: British Gas, PanAmerican 




In this sense, there are at least three important criteria for the emergence and 
survival  of  a  proposal  on  the  policy  agenda  (Kingdon,  1984:132-133).  The  first 
condition is its technical feasibility, which is closely related with the implementation 
phase. After all, an idea only survives in the long-term if it is physically possible.  
For example, since natural gas is highly explosive, any project involving its 
extraction, transportation, liquefaction, or regasification depends on the safety levels 
that can be guaranteed and the risk levels that are considered acceptable. It is not 
surprising to find that projects are often suspended or cancelled because of safety 
concerns by nearby populations.
11  
  The  criterion  of  technical  feasibility  is  highly  elusive  and  not  sufficient  –
especially in the case of highly complex projects. However, there is a tendency to 
obviate  other  aspects  when  evaluating  policy  proposals  (Vanderburg,  2000).  This 
tendency is accentuated in the case of a project like a natural gas pipeline because the 
technical aspects should be considered first -given the safety concerns-, which does 
not make them more important.  
The second condition for the survival of an idea is its value acceptability in the 
community of specialists (Kingdon, 1984:132). That is, a project might be acceptable 
or not, depending on prevailing normative values –such as equity, efficiency, the role 
of the state, or the environment.   
For example, fiscal discipline has become a decisive normative value for the 
survival  of  ideas  in  the  Bolivian  governmental  agenda;  at  least  since  the  first 
structural adjustment program was implemented in 1985 under the government of Paz 
Estenssoro.  Thereafter,  public  expenditure  –especially  for  investment  in 
infrastructure- has been cut down, and all major policy goals are now subordinated to 
attaining an acceptable governmental deficit.  
The LNGP was not an exception. The project represented an investment of 6 
billion dollars (La Prensa, 09-09-03), equivalent to nearly 75% of the Bolivian GDP.
12 
Therefore, it was not possible to implement the project without a long-term increase 
in  the  fiscal  deficit  or  without  allowing  the  full  participation  of  private  firms, 
especially foreign ones.  
 In turn, the participation of private firms introduced global competitiveness as 
an  additional  normative  value  to  be  taken  into  account  in  the  policy  process. 
Consequently,  in  order  to  compete  with  other  global  projects  the  exploitation  of 
natural gas should be done as fast and costless as possible.  As explained later, this 
factor is crucial to understand why the Bolivian government ‘rushed’ to promote and 
announce the LNGP.  
The third condition for the survival of an idea in the policy agenda is related to 
anticipating future constraints; and most importantly budget constraints and public 
acquiescence. The budget constraints are intimately related with the normative value 
of fiscal discipline; the latter has to do with an overall economic goal and the former 
with the operational details of how such a goal is achieved year by year.  
                                                 
11  For  example,  a  report  prepared  by  the  Congressional  Research  Service  of  the  United 
States shows that more than ten import terminals where the natural gas would be regasified 
were suspended or cancelled in the last years in the coasts of Mexico and the United States. 
12 Calculation based on data published by the World Bank (2003),  




The concept of public acquiescence refers to the fact that policy proposals 
need  to  be  acceptable  for  the  general  public,  defined  by  Kingdon  (1984:138)  as 
whatever the community of specialists have in mind when they take into account the 
potential reactions of the public to their proposals.  
In the case study, even when the technical analyses favoured the project to 
export gas via Chile rather than via Peru, it was clear that the project would find 
public opposition on the basis of the limited royalties that the Bolivian State would 
get from the project.  In this context, it seems that the strategy of the government was 
to  create  a  false  debate  about  the  available  alternatives  and  to  delay  the  official 
announcement  for  one  year.
13  In  the  meantime,  the  discourse  used  for  selling  the 
project was changed to stress its side benefits. It was rephrased from ‘a scheme to 
exploit  natural  gas’  to  ‘the  last  opportunity  to  foster  the  social  and  economic 
development of Bolivia’, and even to ‘the last opportunity to recover a sovereign exit 
to the sea’. The language of ‘inevitability’ was not only used by officials from the 
Bolivian  government,  but  by  representatives  of  Pacific  LNG  and  officials  from 
international institutions such as the IMF.  
  The coincidence between a problem and a feasible solution explains a great 
deal of how the policy agenda is formed. However, the explanation of the case study 
is  incomplete  without  taking  into  account  the  broader  socio-political  context  –the 
politics stream.  In this sense, four important components should be considered: the 
governmental willingness, the emergence of global opportunities, the national mood; 
and the distribution of political forces.
14 
The election of Sanchez de Lozada in 2002 was a crucial factor affecting the 
governmental willingness to promote the LNGP. Being an entrepreneur linked to the 
mining sector, Sanchez de Lozada had traditionally favoured the active participation 
of foreign firms in the mining and hydrocarbons sectors. In fact, the controversial 
hydrocarbons law of 1996 was approved at the end of his first mandate as president of 
Bolivia and it was predictable that he would favour the LNGP. 
  At the same time, natural gas projects involve capital investments that are only 
possible when the market is secured through long-term contracts, of at least fifteen 
years. In the absence of such contracts, the monetisation of natural gas is not possible, 
no matter the amount of certified reserves and regardless feasible projects exist or not.  
In  this  respect,  an  additional  factor  that  drove  the  Bolivian  government  to 
promote the project in 2003 was the crisis of natural gas supply that the United States 
experienced  one  year  earlier.  When  this  crisis  was  accompanied  by  public 
declarations of key figures favouring the imports of natural gas
15 and by changes in 
laws  to  ease  the  installation  of  import  terminals,  it  became  a  concrete  global 
opportunity to secure a market and monetise the Bolivian natural gas. From the point 
of view of those promoting the LNGP –i.e. the government of Sanchez de Lozada and 
Pacific LNG-, it was a valuable policy window that should be used swiftly before 
                                                 
13 Exactly one year passed between representatives of Pacific LNG suggesting publicly that 
the best alternative was the port of Patillos in Chile (March, 2002) and the government of 
Sanchez de Lozada making the official announcement (March, 2003).  
14 Kingdon (1984) only mentions the last two, but in the context of an open economy the 
emergence of global opportunities caused by social, economic, and political events in other 
countries also contributes to the politics stream.  
15  The  most  important  was  the  declaration  of  Alan  Greenspan  during  a  congressional 
testimony in June of 2003, calling for ‘a major expansion of LNG terminal import capacity’ 
(Greenspan, 10-Jun-03, cited in Congressional Research Service, 2004) QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS127  Page 8 
 
 
other global competitors could secure favourable contracts to export natural gas to the 
United States.  
However, the national mood and the distribution of political forces are also 
important variables that should be taken into account as part of the politics stream. In 
the  case  study,  it  was  clear  that  none  of  these  two  variables  were  favourable  to 
implement the LNGP in 2003 because: a) in his previous mandate, Sánchez de Lozada 
had promoted other failed experiments to capitalise the hydrocarbons sector; b) the 
governing coalition was formed overnight to win the 2002 elections and it was not 
strong  enough;
16  c)  the  political  parties  that  had  been  excluded  by  such  coalition 
enjoyed enough support to oppose any governmental initiative; and d) the repression 
of  social  mobilisations  at  the  beginning  of  2003
17  and  the  unwillingness  of  the 
president to give any concessions, destroyed the little sympathy and legitimacy that 
the government had to promote any ambitious project.
18  
 In this context, building the necessary consensus and support to implement 
the LNGP looked almost impossible. It meant a complicated process of bargaining 
with other advocacy coalitions (see 2.1) and the accommodation of forces with vested 
interests that would take time, even years. Ultimately, this would probably end up 
with a change of the hydrocarbons law to increase the amount of royalties earned by 
the Bolivian state, a compromise that foreign firms would not accept easily.  
 But  policy  windows  do  not  remain  open  for  long  and  therefore,  decision 
makers  face  the  dilemma  between  postponing  a  project  to  build  the  necessary 
consensus, losing the window of opportunity or proceeding with the project, even 
when not all the potential difficulties are tied up (Kingdon, 1984). The final decision 
is necessarily the result of an inexact calculation based on the cognitive experience of 
policy makers and on prevailing normative values.  
  In the case study, it seems that given the normative values in the policy stream 
–technical feasibility, fiscal discipline, and global competitiveness- the government of 
Sanchez de Lozada overvalued the prevailing market opportunities and the need to 
secure  a  contract  to  sell  natural  gas  to  the  United  States;  and  underestimated  the 
national mood and the  distribution of political forces, including the emergence of 
opposing advocacy coalitions.  The premise was to make use of the policy window, 
even when not all the potential difficulties were tied up.  
   
  
III. Collective Action and ‘Contentious Politics’ 
 
 How did civil society groups in Bolivia gain support and mobilise against the project 
to export liquefied natural gas? What were the key conditions of their success?  
According to social movement theorists (SMTs) a necessary pre-condition is 
the existence of a grievance because people don’t mobilise spontaneously or without a 
reason.  As a first condition, the grievance should be framed in the broader social, 
economic, and historical context so that the group mobilisation makes sense even 
                                                 
16 See footnote 4 and Section 3.2 below.  
17 As explained in Section III, it is important to consider that the mobilisations against the 
LNGP can’t be analysed as an isolated event. When Sánchez de Lozada became president, 
the country was facing a deep economic crisis and he was not able to get financial aid from 
international  actors.  The  main  events  that  contributed  to  this  lack  of  support  were  the 
Argentinean economic crisis and the aftermath of September 11
th.  
18  These  mobilisations  emerged  against  a  new  tax  on  wages  that  was  part  of  a  fiscal 
adjustment plan promoted by the IMF. At the beginning of his mandate, Sanchez de Lozada 
enjoyed rates of approval of 46% but one year later such rates fell to 30% (Vegas, 2003).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS127  Page 9 
 
 
when the probabilities of succeeding are limited. A second condition is the existence 
of mobilising structures that can substitute for the access to material and institutional 
resources.
19 The third condition is the support from powerful allies, and the fourth and 
final condition is the opening of a political opportunity.  
  The main goal of this section is to provide an explanation of the case study by 
analysing the presence of these conditions. An exhaustive analysis of these elements 
is beyond the scope of this work, and therefore the core analysis is centred on the 




3.1) Grievances: A Pre-Condition for Mobilisation 
 
In the case of Bolivia, the mobilisations against the LNGP cannot be analysed in 
isolation. They are part of a longer cycle of protest (Tarrow, 1994) that began in the 
1990s, when the Bolivian population began to experience the social and economic 
consequences of structural adjustment programs (SAPs). The resistance against the 
LNGP is just another chapter in a long list of civil society mobilisations, including 
protests against the coca eradication scheme implemented in 1986, the ‘water war’ in 
1999-2000, and  the mobilisations against increasing taxes at the beginning of 2003. 
In this context, the grievance at the end of 2003 was not the exploitation of 
natural gas per se or the use of a Chilean port to export the liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) to Mexico and the United States.
21 The main grievance was a combination of 
two factors: a) the favourable conditions given to the Pacific LNG Consortium in 
contrast with the limited percentage of royalties that would accrue to the Bolivian 
state  from  the  project;  and  b)  the  fact  that  the  LNGP  was  yet  another  project 
promoted by a government with scarce legitimacy and without properly consulting the 
main stakeholders - the Bolivians themselves. 
  A detailed analysis of public standings, press releases, and interviews of the 
movement leaders supports this hypothesis. This shows that a) the exploitation of 
natural gas not only did not figure as a source of grievance per se, but it was openly 
recognised - even by the most radical groups that opposed the project- as the last 
opportunity to foster the social and economic development of Bolivia; and b) each 
time there was an attempt to reduce the conflict to the decision between a Chilean or a 
Peruvian port to export the natural gas, the response was always similar: ‘…as long as 
the hydrocarbons continue in the hands of the  transnational firms, it is useless to 
discuss if it is going to be via Chile or Peru…’ (Morales, 2003) 
                                                 
19  This  framework  has  often  been  used  to  explain  collective  action  by  ‘outsiders’  or  non-
institutional  actors.  However,  it  might  also  serve  to  explain  mobilisations  by  insiders  and 
stronger actors. An example is given by the mobilisations that emerged in the province of 
Santa Cruz in year 2005, which proclaimed an autonomous government and constituted a 
countermovement to the kind of mobilisations described in this paper.  
20 The rigorous analysis of all these elements requires extensive fieldwork since they are 
‘non-discursive’.  
21 The fact that the natural gas would be industrialised and exported in a Chilean port has 
often been mentioned as the main source of grievance. This claim is based on the symbolic 
importance  that  the  War  of  the  Pacific  (1879)  has  for  Bolivians  -when  Chile  seized  the 
Bolivian littoral and deprived this country from access to the sea-. Although this work does not 
deny that such historical specificity actually played a crucial role in articulating the movement 
against the LNGP, a preliminary analysis of discourses and public stances show that it is 
more  often  mentioned  by  government  officials  than  by  leaders  of  the  social  movement 
themselves.  Compare for example, declarations of the foreign minister, Carlo Saavedra; and 
the president Sanchez de Lozada; with those of Evo Morales in La Prensa (09-09-03) QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS127  Page 10 
 
 
  Therefore,  the  mobilisations  against  the  LNGP  stand  out  from  the  recent 
history of Bolivian contentious politics in one crucial aspect. The objects of grievance 
in  other  mobilisations  had  implied  immediate  –even  overnight-  changes  in  the 
material basis of the participants: the end of an alternative source of livelihood, a 
trade-off between spending money in water or other basic needs, and a reduction in 
the disposable income, respectively.   
By contrast, the LNGP was a national project with deep consequences for the 
country’s long-term pattern of economic growth and socioeconomic development, but 
with no immediate changes in the material basis of those who resisted it. Therefore, it 
was not that easy to define whether it was worth it or not to mobilise against the 
project.  
  In a first stage, between Sanchez de Lozada taking power in September 2002 
and the project being formally announced in March 2003, the LNGP figured as just 
another  grievance  in  the  agenda  of  popular  organisations.  It  was  ‘dissolved’  or 
‘eclipsed’  by  the  most  diverse  demands  brought  forward  by  teachers,  peasants, 
policemen, and other groups. 
In a second stage, the project was announced and the government launched an 
intense media campaign to convince the population about its benefits, including the 
convenience of exporting natural gas via Chile (La Prensa, 09-09-03). As a result, the 
LNGP  ascended  in  the  agenda  of  popular  groups,  but  the  concrete  mobilisations 
against the project were still incipient and non-violent.  
It was not until the military repressed a protest near the locality of Warisata 
and killed six Aymara people that the popular discontent won momentum and the 
mobilisations  against  the  LNGP  increased  dramatically.  Only  then,  an  additional 
factor  contributed  to  make  the  grievance  more  tangible  and  easier  to  identify:  a 
repressive government that once again wanted to promote a project at any cost.  
 
 
3.2) Collective Action Frames: Naming Enemies and Constituencies 
   
But a  grievance is not  enough to trigger  a social mobilisation.  Individuals should 
frame it in broader economic, socio-political, and historical contexts; interpret the 
surrounding events and construct a guide to action (Tarrow, 1992:177). They need to 
build the pronouns ‘we’ –the challengers- and ‘they’ –the challenged- and make them 
visible  through  discursive  devices  that  express  and  publicise  the  foundations  of  a 
social mobilisation. In a few words, it is necessary to build a collective action frame 
(CAF)  with  the  symbolic  power  to  turn  grievances  into  worthwhile  reasons  to 
mobilise. 
  The main challenge is to frame claims so that a movement gains sufficient 
critical mass (Marwell and Oliver, 1993:1-4); it needs to be familiar
22 enough to be 
understood  by  members  of  the  movement,  but  sufficiently  flexible
23  to  adapt  to 
changing  circumstances  and  attract  powerful  allies.  To  achieve  both  objectives 
simultaneously,  the  available  symbols  and  meanings  should  be  reshaped  and 
readapted (Snow and Benford, 1992:136; Tarrow, 1998:109). 
                                                 
22 The term ‘familiar’ refers to the capacity to make reference to circumstances or symbols 
that are well known by potential supporters of a movement. 
23  The  term  ‘flexible’  refers  to  the  capacity  to  be  adopted  by  potential  supporters  without 




  In the case of the movement to resist against the LNGP, the CAF was based on 
three  discursive  references  that  were  familiar  and  flexible  enough  to  appeal  for 
potential supporters and powerful allies. None of these references were new and did 
not appear spontaneously when the project was announced. The first element was 
historical-ideological, the second element was one of political culture, and the last one 
was ethno-nationalistic. The three of them intermingled in a discourse that named the 
government of Sanchez de Lozada and the transnational firms as ‘the enemy’ and ‘all 
those who have suffered from their repressive neoliberal policies’ as the potential 
constituency of the social movement. 
  The first source was the historical memory of ‘the fights that the Bolivian 
people  have  sustained  against  the  unjust  elite  and  the  repressive  government’ 
(Mamani, 02-10-03). In this respect, the peasant movement in Bolivia has been strong 
since the beginning of the 20
th century. The need to organise and fight to consolidate 
their communal land and gain access to health and education programs contributed to 
the construction of a shared identity already in the 1920s (Cárdenas, 1988:516).   
Such  identity,  based  on  the  idea  of  a  common  historical  fight  was  later 
reinforced during the War with Paraguay at the beginning of the 1930s and during two 
decades of fights that culminated in 1952 when the peasant movement defeated the 
army  and  achieved  the  nationalization  of  the  mining  sector,  as  well  as  agrarian, 
educative, and voting reforms (Mamani, 02-10-03). 
  In the last decades the elderly have orally transmitted the historical memory of 
these conflicts with the accompanying sentiment of pride. This latter is particularly 
important  in  the  communities  of  Sorata  and  Warisata  where  people  participated 
actively in the war against Paraguay -and where the first protests were repressed by 
the military in 2003. The people in these communities even keep the guns used in 
1952 as a symbol of the ‘…historical legitimacy to become the guides of the country’s 
destiny…’ (Mamani, 02-10-03). 
In the last fifteen years ‘the fight against neoliberal policies promoted by the 
State  and  their  pervasive  effects’  has  become  the  last  chapter  of  this  historical-
ideological
24 quest. Many social mobilisations since the mid 1980s have been against 
projects identified either as neoliberal –like the privatisation of water services- or as 
by-products of neoliberal policies –like the scheme to eradicate coca harvests.   
Therefore, the LNGP did not trigger the creation of a completely new identity 
but  made  once  again  visible  that  many  social  groups  were  structurally  and 
ideologically placed in opposition to the recent policies promoted by the State. In this 
context, it was framed as part of the grievances suffered by various groups, including 
those protesting against the coca eradication scheme or those who protested against 
the privatisation of water three years earlier.   
The  repression  in  Warisata  worked  as  a  further  catalyser  to  activate  and 
reshape  an  identity  that  was  already  shared  by  many  groups.  It  deprived  the 
government  of  Sanchez  de  Lozada  of  any  legitimacy  left  and  provided  social 
organisations with the legitimacy necessary to oppose the project nationwide. The 
pronoun ‘we’ did not stand for those who have suffered the repression because of the 
LNGP,  but  for  those  in  Bolivia  who  have  suffered  any  sort  of  repression  by  the 
government promoting neoliberal policies. 
                                                 
24 Here the term ‘ideological’ refers to the underlying assumption –which might be right or not- 
of certain distribution of power between different actors. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS127  Page 12 
 
 
The second element was a well consolidated political culture based on ‘the 
fight  to  recover  and  open  new  democratic  spaces’.  In  this  sense,  the  peasant 
movement has been crucial for the democratisation processes of the last two decades. 
By the mid 1990s popular organisations not only engaged in protesting activities, but 
had  become  active  players  in  the  arena  of  formal  politics.  The  first  indigenous 
political parties were created short after the law of decentralisation was approved in 
1995, but were grounded in popular organisations that had been consolidated since the 
1970s  (Van Cott, 2003:755). 
 In 2000, the successful protests against a scheme to privatise water services in 
the locality of Cochabamba increased the visibility of Evo Morales and Felipe Quispe, 
two  important  leaders  of  the  resistance  against  the  LNGP.  This  victory  and  the 
increasing  disillusionment  with  the  performance  of  traditional  political  parties 
contributed to the strength of indigenous political parties which received 27% of the 
votes in the presidential elections of 2002 (Van Cott, 752; 770).  
However,  under  the  Bolivian  electoral  laws  if  no  candidate  wins  with  an 
absolute majority in the first round, the president should be elected by the Congress in 
a second round.  In 2002, the two candidates that competed in the second round were 
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada from the MNR and Evo Morales from the MAS. Then, 
given  the  threat  that  a  candidate  from  a  non-traditional  political  party  could  be 
elected, the three traditional political parties -MNR, MIR, and ADN- made a coalition 
to block the victory of Evo Morales and allow the election of Sanchez de Lozada 
(Van Cott, 2003).  
As a result, the political coalition that reached the executive power in 2002 
was weak and unstable,
25 while the collective identity of the popular movement was 
galvanised  as  ‘we’,  the  ones  from  whom  democracy  has  been  stolen  and  who 
challenge ‘them’, the ones who have stolen democracy (Morales et al., 2003). 
Third  and  final,  the  CAF  borrowed  from  and  intermingled  with  an  ethno-
nationalistic discourse that had long been used by indigenous groups, particularly the 
Aymaras. This discourse advocates for the restitution of original forms of political 
and socioeconomic organisation that were characteristic of the Aymara people before 
the Spanish conquest.  
These references might have worked as powerful devices to win constituencies 
for  two  main  reasons.  First,  61%  of  the  population  in  Bolivia  is  indigenous  and 
second,  the  recent  socioeconomic  crises  affecting  the  majority  of  the  Bolivian 
population  may  have  accentuated  the  feeling  that  there  is  a  need  to  redesign  and 
rebuild the whole social and political system. 
 
 
3.3) Mobilising Structures and Powerful Allies 
 
The  collective  action  frame  and  the  new  constructed  identities
  are  crucial  for 
understanding  a  social  movement.  However,  ‘...identification  does  not  equal 
association or organisation...’ (Schaffer, 1985: 51) and therefore, the analysis of other 
elements proposed by SMTs becomes even more important.  
                                                 
25 In a contra factual scenario, this does not mean that the coalition around the MAS would 
have been stronger or more legitimate. In any case, the problem is the polarisation of Bolivian 
politics  between  those  supporting  traditional  parties  and  those  supporting  popular-based 




  The  CAF  is  not  a  mere  rhetorical  device,  unrelated  with  the  material 
conditions  of  a  movement’s  constituency.  Since  it  is  based  on  concrete  political, 
social, and historical contexts, it hints to the existence of mobilising structures
26 and 
the presence of potential powerful allies that are determinant for the scope and scale 
of a social movement.  
Beyond  its  emotional  and  evocative  functions  the  memory  of  previous 
historical fights activated three mobilising structures that have survived over the years 
and that are still active and working (Mamani, 02-10-03). These are: a) organisational 
models  used  traditionally  by  indigenous  groups,  b)  probed  and  well-learned 
repertoires  of  contention  (Tilly,  1978),  and  c)  traditional  indigenous-peasant 
leadership. 
Firstly, contemporary organisational models such as the peasant unions have 
not totally supplanted traditional ones based on the ayllus. They have complemented 
them and in many cases, the original models have only changed name (Cardenas, 
1988:516;  Carter,  1988:456-486).    Even  when  the  principles  of  economic 
individualism  have  disrupted  the  ayllu,  the  communal  sense  and  organisational 
experience are still present in many activities, from the organisation of festivities to 
the building of roads (Carter, 1988:474). 
  Secondly, the coalition between peasants and workers to strike and paralyse 
the country was not new in the repertoires of contention used by mobilising groups in 
Bolivia. Such a measure was already used successfully in 1979 to put pressure on the 
government  (Cardenas,  1988:527)  and  it  has  been  used  repeatedly  thereafter.  The 
same  can  be  said  of  marches  to  the  main  cities  of  Bolivia,  blocking  of  roads,  or 
hunger strikes by the movement leaders. 
  Third and finally, a network of traditional leaders or mallkus
27 that had been 
reshaped  and  consolidated  since  the  beginning  of  the  20
th  Century  was  crucial  to 
provide the movement with enough critical mass (Marwell and Oliver, 1993:1-4).  In 
this sense, the figure of the mallku is nowadays transposed with the union’s leadership 
and has an enormous mobilising capacity that in many cases –like the example of 
Felipe  Quispe  as  executive  secretary  of  the  CSUTB-
28  reaches  nationwide  scales 
(Mamani, 2003).  
On the other hand, the historical consolidation of these mobilising structures 
contributed  to  the  protagonist  role  that  popular  organisations  had  in  the 
democratisation processes since the 1970s.  Progressively, many of these civil society 
groups used their organisational experience, repertoires of contention and traditional 
leadership to participate and push reforms in the arena of formal politics.  
  Then, the law of decentralisation of 1994 and the law of popular participation 
of 1995 –a symbolical victory for the Aymara movement-constituted a turning point 
in the relation between popular organisations and political parties. By creating 311 
new municipalities in rural areas and by recognising the personality of indigenous 
communities and peasant unions, these laws provided grass roots  groups with the 
                                                 
26  For  the  purposes  of  this  work,  I  will  define  ‘mobilising  structures’  as  the  devices  that 
individuals use to get together, transfer information about values, ideas, and projects; and 
turn individual demands into group claims (Castells, 1983; Tarrow, 1992, 1998; Zald, 1992). 
27 The closest translation to the Aymara term of mallku is that of ‘authority’, whose legitimacy 
is in turn based on its generosity and capacity to redistribute. See Platt (1988:408)  
28  CSUTB  stands  for  ‘Confederación  Sindical  Única  de  Trabajadores  de  Bolivia’  (Bolivian 
Confederation of Workers Unions).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS127  Page 14 
 
 
power to create their own political parties and participate in election processes (Klein, 
2003:261-262).  
 Therefore, the reference to the fight for new democratic spaces was more than 
a rhetorical allusion. It legitimated the support of powerful allies in the institutional 
arena,  most  importantly  of  indigenous  political  parties  like  the  Movimiento  al 
Socialismo and the Movimiento Indígena Pachakutik –led by Evo Morales and Felipe 
Quispe respectively.  
Both  political  organisations  contributed  with  an  institutional  platform  to 
oppose the government’s initiatives –including the LNGP-, an additional forum to 
gain constituencies, networking capacity in the national level, material resources and 
political legitimacy to reject the project.  
Finally, the migration of Aymara people to the cities has contributed to the 
penetration  of  their  culture  and  the  manifestation  of  their  identity  in  new  social 
spheres.
29 There are a number of bilingual Aymaras that are teachers or professionals 
in various sectors and therefore, ‘being Aymara’ does not mean ‘to be a peasant’ 
anymore (Albó, 1988:31). 
In this sense, the reference to an ethno-nationalistic discourse provided the 
movement  with  powerful  allies  and  additional  mobilising  capacity  in  different 
localities of Bolivia and in some cases, outside the country.  Even with little or no 
formal coordination, service and commercial units were closed in solidarity with the 
movement;  university  campuses  provided  with  physical  spaces  to  coordinate  and 
discuss  mobilising  activities;  and  Aymara  intellectuals  expressed  their  support  in 
Ecuador, Peru, and other neighbouring countries. 
Overall, the existence of functional mobilising structures and the presence of 
potential  powerful  allies  turned  the  constructed  ‘we’,  the  ones  who  have  fought 
historically, the ones who have contributed to the democratisation of the country, and 
in some cases, the ones who identify with or support the Aymara nation, into ‘we’, the 
ones who can actually mobilise against the government. 
Then,  with  the  capacity  to  combine  contentious  politics  and  institutional 
resources the movement expanded nationally. By mid October 2003, the LNGP was 
not  possible  without  further  repression  and  without  confrontations  between  the 
military and mobilising groups. Isolated by members of his cabinet and with little 
legitimacy left, Sanchez de Lozada had no alternative but to cancel the project and 
present his resignation. 
 
 
3.4) Political Opportunities 
 
Finally,  social  movement  theorists  have  pointed  to  the  existence  of  a  political 
opportunity as an important condition for contentious collective action (Jenkins, 1984; 
Tarrow, 1992). Defined as a re-alignment of political forces in such a way that new 
and  old  actors  have  the  opportunity  to  become  visible,  a  political  opportunity 
represents a chance for political opponents to block governmental initiatives; and a 
chance for social groups that have been systematically excluded by public policies to 
get the attention of authorities. 
                                                 
29 In this sense, Albó (1988:262) has documented that even Aymaras living in urban areas 
continue  different  traditions  such  as  the  celebration  of  Pachamama,  the  goddess  of 




  Firstly,  the  government  of  Sanchez  de  Lozada  was  a  last-minute  coalition 
conformed by three different parties with dissimilar ideologies and political platforms 
with  the  objective  of  winning  the  elections  in  2002  (Van  Cott,  2003:760).  The 
weaknesses and divisions of such coalition were already evident at the beginning of 
2003  when  the  government  repressed  –unsuccessfully-  a  number  of  social 
mobilisations against a scheme to implement a new tax on salaries. 
In this context, the LNGP was a complex and ambitious project that required a 
minimum level of consensus. However, none of the three traditional parties agreed 
completely on a policy for the exploitation of natural gas and all of them expressed 
differences about the project’s details (see 2.1).   
The military, a crucial actor for containing the social mobilisations was also 
divided. On one hand, the high ranks agreed that the LNGP was the last opportunity 
to negotiate a sovereign port with Chile; but on the other, the lower ranks favoured the 
opposition against it (La Prensa, 09-09-03).  
A loose governmental coalition and divisions within the military
30 represented 
a political opportunity for those excluded in the elections of 2002. It was a chance to 
block the initiative of a government that was vulnerable  and do not have enough 
legitimacy; and depending on the responses to the social mobilisations, an opportunity 
for  contributing  to  its  collapse.  Therefore,  it  was  not  surprising  that  Sanchez  de 
Lozada  found  himself  isolated  after  everything  had  gone  wrong  with  the 
announcement and implementation of the project.   
Secondly,  discourses  and  public  stances  by  groups  that  mobilised  during 
September and October of 2003 show a mix of demands that go beyond the LNGP. 
This was not only a consequence of a collective action frame that was flexible and 
familiar enough to attract constituencies (see 2.2), but of the opening of a concrete 
political opportunity. 
The  LNGP  was  such  an  important  project  that  any  opposition  to  it  would 
certainly catch the attention of the government.
31 But being the main issue at stake, 
the LNGP worked as an ‘attraction field’ and opened a space in the public arena for 
other groups to show up and place their demands.  
 Even with little or no coordination, social mobilisations increased in different 
provinces of Bolivia and took the city of La Paz by the beginning of October. The 
demands and claims ranged from agricultural programs to rejecting the FTAA (Free 
Trade  of  Agreement  of  the  Americas)  and  demanding  the  freedom  of  political 
prisoners.  
In summary, the project became not only a source of grievance, but a potential 
political opportunity for two kinds of actors: a) those that had been unsuccessful in 
placing  their  particular  demands  before  the  government;  and  b)  those  that  were 
excluded by the political system in the elections of 2002.  
                                                 
30 See La Prensa (09-09-03) 
31 Although, as explained later this does not mean that the normative values ruling the policy 
process would easily be changed or that the government would grant concessions to any 





IV. Policy Windows and Collective Action Frames 
 
In  what  ways  is  the  policy  process  of  the  liquefied  natural  gas  related  to  the 
mobilisations that emerged to reject it? In what ways can a policy window trigger the 
construction of a collective action frame?  
  Public policy is related with the emergence of contentious collective action in 
two ways. Firstly, if the social implications of a project are disregarded, the very 
process of public policy becomes a source of grievance for those stakeholders that are 
not consulted. And under certain conditions -analysed in section III- a grievance can 
be framed to shape a suitable collective action frame (CAF). 
  In turn, the CAF is not merely a discursive tool. It is the expression of social 
and historical realities and therefore, is intimately related to pre-existing mobilising 
structures. Thus, if the policy process minimises the social and historical variables, it 
is likely to underestimate the potential resistance to a project. 
  Secondly, if a policy window is an opportunity to implement a project, it may 
also turn into a political opportunity for some groups to mobilise and get the attention 
of policy makers, as explained in Section III and extended below. 
  As  already  mentioned,  more  fieldwork  is  required  for  a  more  conclusive 
analysis and therefore, the main aims of this section are to use notions of contentious 
politics and public policy to make sense of the case study; and to pose questions for 
future research. 
   
 
4.1 The Policy Process as a Source of Grievance 
 
The policy process becomes a source of grievance at two levels.  At the level of 
practice,  policy  makers  operate  according  to  a  compartmentalised  conception  of 
reality, a practical way to breakdown problems into labels such as ‘the technical’, ‘the 
economic’, or ‘the social’. This compartmentalisation obeys to normative values that 
prevail in the policy stream, assign different weights to different problems, and dictate 
which variables justify more attention. 
  At the level of discourse,
32 policy makers need to justify why certain variables 
do not deserve an exhaustive analysis. Assumptions about problems, agents, and their 
relations  reduce  implications  of  public  policy  to  scales  that  are  intellectually 
manageable (Dryzek, 1997:80-81). 
  Both levels –practice and discourse- shape the cognitive experience of policy 
makers and their particular way of apprehending reality (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1999:131; Vanderburg, 2000:67). In their minds, the world looks like a ‘chessboard’ 
that  can  be  rationally  and  deliberately  modified.  Therefore,  the  ‘peasant’  or  the 
‘indigenous  leader’  is  just  another  piece  that  can  be  neutralised  or  not  taken  into 
account.  
  In the case study, the government of Sanchez de Lozada promoted a project 
that met the normative  values of technical feasibility, fiscal discipline,  and global 
competitiveness. However, the social, political, and historical specificities that could 
hinder  its  implementation  were  badly  taken  into  account.  Instead  of  opening  the 
                                                 
32 ‘Discourse’ is defined as a ‘…shared way of apprehending the world that is embedded in 
language and enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them 
together into coherent stories or accounts…’ (Dryzek, 1997:8)  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS127  Page 17 
 
 
policy  process  to  allow  the  main  stakeholders  –the  Bolivians  themselves-  to 
appropriate the project and modify it -i.e., changing the hydrocarbons law to increase 
the royalties received by the Bolivian state-, the government ‘closed’ the process and 
created a false debate about the most suitable port to export the LNG.      
  At  the  level  of  discourse,  the  omission  was  legitimated  in  two  manners. 
Firstly, the LNGP was considered as ‘the last opportunity that Bolivia has to foster its 
development’.  And secondly, even when there were signs of resistance against it, the 
opposing groups were conceived as ‘peasants’ or even ‘criminals’, with no legitimacy 
to negotiate with the government.  
  Three issues emerge from this analysis: a) whether the cognitive experience of 
policy  makers  can  be  re-shaped;  b)  whether  prevailing  normative  values  are 
modifiable to take into account relevant variables; and c) whether such adjustment is 
possible through institutional channels of representation and avoiding confrontation 
with mobilising groups.  
  A definite answer cannot be provided without extensive fieldwork, especially 
on the nature of the policy process around the LNGP. However, at least in theory 
shortcomings in the policy process play an important role in oversimplifying reality. 
Therefore, if these deficiencies are overcome certain problems may become visible, 
even if this implies an adjustment of normative values in the policy stream (Kingdon, 
1984; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:138). For example, with enough information 
about an issue that has been minimised during the policy process, a public policy 
might be taken off the governmental agenda and a policy window closes –if it ever 
appeared- (Kingdon, 1984:169). 
  Unfortunately, the cancellation of the LNGP can only illustrate how normative 
values were modified too late after confrontations with contentious groups escalated. 
Firstly, a policy window appeared in 2003 and the main task was to implement a 
project that met the requirements of technical feasibility, fiscal discipline, and global 
competitiveness. In turn, these normative values dictated the hierarchy and relative 
importance of problems that should be tackled. It seems that the social and political 
dimensions of the project were relegated. 
  Secondly, even when the LNGP did not imply an immediate change in the 
material basis of those who mobilised to resist it, it was implemented in the context of 
a  delicate  distribution  of  political  forces  and  of  general  disapproval  given  the 
prevailing economic situation and recent repressions of other mobilising groups. The 
margin of error was narrow and therefore, any unexpected event, any step out of the 
line could make the LNGP impossible.  
  The  drop  that  ‘spilled  over’  came  in  September  2003,  when  a  group  of 
Aymara people from the community of Warisata blocked roads to demand a rural 
development plan and protest against the LNGP and the Free Trade of Agreement of 
the  Americas  (BBC,  18/10/03).  A  number  of  tourists,  including  some  American 
citizens were trapped by the demonstrations and the American embassy put pressure 
on the Bolivian government to break the blockades and realise them (La Prensa, 21-
09-03).  
  The  government’s  response  was  to  launch  a  military  operation  led  by  the 
minister of defence himself. The confrontation with the protesting groups ended with 
several people dead, including a five-year-old child (La Prensa, 04-10-03).  It was 
after this repressive action that the MAS and other social and political organisations 




  Thirdly, the government of Sanchez de Lozada showed ambiguous responses 
to the month-long protests that took place around the country between the end of 
September and mid-October of 2003. The attempts to solve the conflict via dialogue 
were followed by confrontations resulting in the death of more than thirty people.  
  Three factors might explain this ambiguous response: a) the underestimation 
of the social movement; b) the resistance to reconsider the normative values that ruled 
the policy process and therefore, to cancel a project that was feasible and convenient 
from the technical and economic point of view, but socially and politically unfeasible; 
and c) the pressure from international actors such as the International Monetary Fund. 
  In the meantime, the collective action frame that was crafted to justify the 
social movement activated existing mobilising structures and appealed to powerful 
allies, as explained in Section 3.3. By the time the government began to open the 
policy process, the movement had already radicalised and protesting groups taken the 
city of La Paz.
33  
  Fourth and finally, it seems that confrontations between the 11
th and the 13
th of 
October triggered the final reconsideration of the project. Now, the social and political 
factors weighted more than the economic and technical. The normative values ruling 
the policy process had been adjusted. As a result, members of the cabinet withdrew 
their support to President Sanchez de Lozada, the project was cancelled, the president 
was expelled, and the vice-president took over and offered to organise a referendum 
to decide the best alternative to exploit the natural gas. The policy window was finally 
closed.   
 
 
4.2 Policy Windows as Political Opportunities 
 
Policy makers and supporters of social mobilisations move according to their own 
cognitive  experiences  and  ‘rules  of  the  game’.  Therefore,  what  is  perceived  by 
decision makers as a valuable policy window (Kingdon, 1984) might at the same time 
be a political opportunity for group supporters (Tarrow, 1998).  
  Moreover, a policy window that is badly managed may become the point of 
departure to construct a collective action frame that justifies the opposition against a 
project  or  a  public  policy.  The  distinction  between  the  project  per  ser  and  its 
respective policy process is not trivial: the fact that a mobilisation is triggered by a 
non inclusive –and sometimes repressive- process does not mean that it opposes the 
essence of a project –e.g. exploiting the natural gas. 
  However, the task of finding the real aims behind the discourses and public 
stances of a mobilising group is not an easy one. The CAF has an accentuating and 
strategic  character  because  it  serves  to  publicise  and  make  visible  grievances, 
demands, constituencies, and constructed identities (3.2). Distorting and overstating is 
part of its strategic nature to challenge authorities and achieve a solution for a given 
grievance. Moreover, since the CAF functions as an umbrella for different groups it is 
likely to find differing goals between different supporters and powerful allies of a 
social movement.  
                                                 
33  On  the  5
th  of  October,  vice-president  Carlos  Mesa  offered  to  increase  the  royalties 
perceived by the  Bolivian  State from the LNGP  and on the 15
th of October the president 
offered to organise a general consultation with the Bolivian people about the LNGP. However, 
thousands of people had already taken the streets of La Paz and by the 6
th of October, the 
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  What  were  the  main  goals  behind  the  opposition  against  the  LNGP?  A 
preliminary analysis of the case study shows at least three non-mutually-exclusive 
possibilities: a) it was a struggle for redistribution and the main goal was to change 
the project and increase the royalties accrued to the Bolivian state; b) it was a struggle 
for political power and the main goal was to hamper a project that was promoted by a 
government constituted by political opponents; and c) it was a struggle for recognition 
and  the  main  goal  was  not  to  cancel  the  project  but  to  increase  the  visibility  of 
marginalised and disfavoured groups.  
   In the first case –a redistribution struggle-, one may ask if it was actually 
feasible to modify the project to increase the royalties received by the Bolivian state 
or to industrialise the natural gas before exporting it.  In other words, it is necessary to 
enquire whether the language of inevitability and the discourse portraying the LNGP 
as the last chance to foster the economic development of Bolivia (see Section 2.3) was 
applicable or a distortion of reality. 
  If none of the policy alternatives proposed by other advocacy coalitions were 
actually possible and therefore the LNGP constituted the dramatic ‘last opportunity’ 
for Bolivia, then the success of the social movement can only be relative because the 
main goal –redistribution through exploitation and monetisation of natural gas- was 
not achieved. In other words, to stop a repressive and non-inclusive government may 
be considered as a success; but to miss a window of opportunity is not an achievement 
if the opposition was not against the monetisation of natural gas per se.
 34  
  The problem when a public policy is hampered via contentious politics is the 
unequal  levels  of  accountability  between  policy  makers  and  leaders  of  social 
mobilisations.    While  policy  makers  are  accountable  for  the  pervasive  effects  of 
public policies or for the lost benefits if these are cancelled; social leaders
35 are only 
accountable for preventing the first ones.  
  With adequate channels of representation, contentious actors could appropriate 
public  policies,  influence  the  policy  process,  and  change  the  respective  normative 
values. They could even stop projects, but they would at least become accountable for 
the last consequences –e.g. missing a policy window. 
  In  the  second  case  –political  struggle-,  the  movement  may  be  considered 
successful  because  it  not  only  forced  the  cancellation  of  the  project,  but  also  the 
resignation of Sanchez de Lozada and a rearrangement of political forces. However, 
the  problem  when  an  excluded  political  group  opposes  a  project  promoted  by  a 
government with scarce legitimacy remains the same as in the case of a redistribution 
struggle. Social movement leaders are only accountable for the political victory, but 
not for the lost economic benefits. 
  In the third and final case –recognition struggle-, it may be argued that the 
cancellation of the LNGP has a symbolic importance and that it was actually a victory 
for the social movement. However, such symbolic importance might actually decrease 
or be negotiable if adequate channels of representation allow for the recognition and 
accommodation of different stakeholders.  
  Whatever the case, the implications are the same. On the one hand, social and 
political difficulties arise when policy makers have no adequate feedback to adjust 
normative  values,  reconsider  a  policy  window,  or  design  policies  that  take  into 
account  potential  discontent  in  the  social  and  political  arenas.  On  the  other, 
                                                 
34 Rather than the opposition against the particular project promoted by Pacific LNG and/or its 
respective policy process. 
35 Although all supporters should in theory be accountable, the leaders play a crucial role in 
articulating the collective action frame of a social movement. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS127  Page 20 
 
 
contentious politics emerge when people lack institutional resources to express their 
concerns and participate in the process of policy making. The main enquiry for future 
research is to find if both difficulties can be resolved through adequate channels of 





Section  II  showed  that  the  case  study  fits  the  basic  assumptions  of  the  multiple 
streams  framework:  the  existence  of  four  streams  –actors,  problems,  policies,  and 
politics- that when coinciding, open  a policy  window.  It also shows that the  first 
stream  –  actors-  can  be  complemented  with  the  notion  of  advocacy  coalitions,  as 
theorised by Sabatier (1999). 
  On  the  basis  of  these  theories  it  seems  that  the  coincidence  between  the 
discovery of new reserves of natural gas, the existence of a feasible project proposed 
by  Pacific  LNG,  and  the  energy  crisis  in  the  United  States  opened  a  window  of 
opportunity for the Bolivian government.  
Considering the lack of consensus in the politics stream and the emergence of 
opposing  advocacy  coalitions,  the  government  of  Sanchez  de  Lozada  faced  the 
dilemma between postponing the project to build the necessary consensus, losing the 
window of opportunity or proceeding with the project, even when not all the potential 
difficulties  were  tied  up.  At  the  end,  it  seems  that  an  inexact  calculation  led  the 
government  of  Sanchez  de  Lozada  to  overvalue  the  market  opportunities  and 
undervalue the social and political opposition.  
But this is just a partial account of the case study. Even potential political and 
social  opposition  is  not  a  guarantee  that  such  opposition  is  going  to  mobilise 
effectively and successfully. Moreover, it does not explain why it was the LNGP and 
not another government initiative that forced Sanchez de Lozada to resign in 2003. 
Therefore, to fully understand the case study, it is necessary to analyse the other side 
of the equation: the emergence of mobilisations against the project.  
  In this respect, Section III shows that the success of the social mobilisations 
against the LNGP depended on four conditions. In the first place, there were three 
sources  of  grievance:  a)  the  favourable  conditions  given  to  the  Pacific  LNG 
Consortium;  b)  the  fact  that  the  LNGP  was  yet  another  project  promoted  by  a 
government  with  scarce  legitimacy  and  without  properly  consulting  the  main 
stakeholders; and c) the repressive actions of a government that once again wanted to 
promote a project at any cost.  
  Then, the movement crafted a collective action frame that was familiar and 
flexible enough to gain sufficient critical mass. Three elements are identifiable in this 
discursive device: the first one was historical-ideological, the second element was one 
of political culture, and the last one was ethno-nationalistic. 
In  turn,  these  discursive  elements  activated  existing  mobilising  structures. 
Most  important  to  mention  are:  a)  organisational  models  used  traditionally  by 
indigenous  groups,  b)  probed  and  well-learned  repertoires  of  contention;  and  c) 
traditional  indigenous-peasant  leadership.  At  the  same  time,  the  same  discursive 
elements attracted the support of two kinds of powerful allies: indigenous political 
parties and Aymara groups living in urban areas and outside Bolivia. 
Fourth and final, in the context of a loose governmental coalition and divisions 
within the military the project opened a political opportunity for those excluded in the 
elections of 2002. At the same time, the LNGP worked as an ‘attraction field’ and QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS127  Page 21 
 
 
opened  space  for  groups  that  had  been  unsuccessful  in  placing  their  particular 
demands before the government.  
By bringing together both analyses –public policy and contentious politics- 
this  work  has  attempted  to  show  a)  that  the  policy  process  becomes  a  source  of 
grievance when policy makers –through practice and discourse- minimise the social, 
political, and historical implications of a project; b) that the potential resistance to a 
project is likely to be underestimated if the policy process minimises these variables; 
c) that under certain circumstances, a policy window is also a political opportunity for 
mobilising groups; and d) that deficiencies in the policy process might be overcome if 
adequate channels of representation are designed. Future research should focus on this 
latter issue. 
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